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 In the United States, corporate criminal liability developed in response to the industrial 
revolution and the rise in the scope and importance of corporate activities.  This article focuses 
principally on federal law, which bases corporate criminal liability on the respondeat superior 
doctrine developed in tort law.  Federal law dominates the principal fields in which corporate 
prosecutions arise, and federal prosecutions are much more numerous and significant than state 
prosecutions.  In the federal system, the formative period for the doctrine of corporate criminal 
liability was the early Twentieth Century, when Congress dramatically expanded the reach of 
federal law, responding to the unprecedented concentration of economic power in corporations 
and combinations of business concerns as well as new hazards to public health and safety.  Both 
the initial development of the doctrine and the evolution in its use reflect a utilitarian and 
pragmatic view of criminal law.   
 
 
 For many years there has been widespread criticism of the general principle of corporate 
crime, and most scholars agree that the respondeat superior standard is overbroad.  Although the 
doctrine has remained unchanged, administrative responses by the Department of Justice and the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission have reshaped the practice in ways that respond to the critiques and 
restrict the effective reach of corporate liability.  As a result of this evolution in the enforcement 
of corporate criminal liability, only a very small number of corporations are convicted, and the 
penalties imposed on those that are convicted are adjusted to reflect corporate culpability.  
Nevertheless, the broad potential for criminal liability has significant consequences for a wide 
range of corporate behavior.  Corporations have powerful incentives to perform internal 
investigations, cooperate with both regulators and prosecutors, and actively pursue settlement of 
claims of misconduct.  To avoid criminal liability, corporations also enter into deferred 
prosecution agreements that often require changes in corporate business practices and 
governance as well as monitoring to ensure compliance.  The purpose of these administrative 
responses attempt is to reduce or eliminate the negative effects of imposing criminal liability 
while exploiting the law’s power to deter criminal behavior, improve corporate citizenship, and 
bring about beneficial structural reforms. These developments also reflect general trends, in 
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which Sentencing Guidelines and the regulation of prosecutorial discretion served as indirect 
substitutes for more comprehensive reforms of the federal criminal code.   
 
 The first section describes the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of corporate criminal 
liability and the judicial development of the standards for liability; it also describes an alternative 
standard proposed by the American Law Institute and adopted in some states.  The second 
section explores critiques of the federal reliance on corporate criminal liability, alternative 
justifications for the doctrine and proposals for reform.  The third section describes the 
development of enforcement and sentencing practices that significantly restrict the reach of 
entity liability and base penalties on corporate culpability, while also allowing corporate 
prosecutions to serve as a spur for significant internal corporate reforms. 
 
I. The Development of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
 The spread of industrialization in England and the United States spurred the development 
of corporate criminal liability. English courts permitted the prosecution of corporate non-
feasance as early as the mid-Nineteenth Century, and by the Twentieth Century the English 
courts developed a doctrine of identification under which corporations could be prosecuted for 
crimes of intent.
1
  In the United States, although some earlier state cases recognized corporate 
criminal liability, the seminal case in the development of federal criminal law was New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, decided in 1909.
2
 
 
A. The New York Central case 
 The New York Central case arose under legislation enacted during an era when Congress 
dramatically enlarged the reach of federal law.
3
  Before the Civil War, there were very few 
federal crimes and little overlap between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.  The United 
States Constitution created a federal government with only limited delegated powers, and federal 
authority was confined to matters granted to the central government.  The Constitution explicitly 
authorized the federal government to prosecute only four kinds of offenses: treason, 
counterfeiting, crimes against the law of nations, and crimes on the high seas, such as piracy.  
Additionally, the Constitution authorized Congress to pass laws it found to be “necessary and 
proper” to effectuate other delegated powers.  Because the federal government’s programs and 
activities were relatively few, the laws that rested on this authority were correspondingly narrow.  
In contrast, general police powers (including the bulk of criminal law) were reserved to the 
states. 
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 After the Civil War, Congress significantly expanded the scope of federal criminal law.
4
  
Although other factors also played a role, the most significant impetus for the expansion of 
federal authority was the dramatic postwar economic expansion and the growth in interstate 
commerce fueled by the development of a national rail system.  The growth in interstate 
transportation and commerce created new problems that were beyond the reach of individual 
states.  Employing its authority under the Commerce Clause, Congress responded.  The earliest 
federal statutes were quite narrow.  For example, Congress made it a federal crime to transport 
explosives and cattle with contagious diseases in interstate commerce.  At the end of the 
Nineteenth Century, however, Congress employed its authority to enact sweeping legislation 
aimed at monopolistic activity that interfered with interstate commerce.  The Interstate 
Commerce Commission Act of 1887,
5
 the first federal law to regulate private industry, regulated 
the railroad industry and required that railroad rates be “reasonable and just.”6  It prohibited price 
discrimination against smaller markets, such as farmers, and it created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC).  In 1890, Congress enacted the Sherman Act, which outlawed attempts to 
monopolize and conspiracies to restrain commerce.
7
   
 
 Both the ICC and President Theodore Roosevelt called upon Congress to enact additional 
legislation to strengthen the restrictions on the railroads and other industries.  As early as 1891, 
the ICC asked Congress to supplement the law that authorized criminal liability for individuals 
with corporate criminal liability.  Noting that the federal courts had held that corporations could 
not be prosecuted for criminal violations under the 1887 Act, the ICC argued that the 1887 Act 
was “defective at an important point” requiring immediate correction.8  The Commission argued 
that allowing the imposition of criminal fines directly on the railroads was desirable for several 
reasons.
9
  First, when the violations benefitted only the railroad, but not its officers and agents, 
the public–and jurors–were likely to disfavor convicting individual defendants regardless of the 
strength of the evidence.  Second, when the corporation,  the real beneficiary of a criminal 
violation “not only goes unpunished, but is adjudged incapable of criminal wrongdoing,  the law 
is effectively nullified and brought into “general discredit.”  Finally, in some cases individual 
prosecutions were infeasible because of the difficulty of identifying any particular employee who 
was responsible.  President Roosevelt, who took office in 1901, immediately urged Congress to 
adopt new laws regulating corporations engaging in interstate commerce
10
 and became known as 
a “trust buster” for his aggressive efforts to curb the power of corporate trusts. 
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 In response to these calls for stronger legislation, Congress enacted the Elkins Act of 
1903,
11
 which created corporate criminal liability for railroads under the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Act.  It provided: 
 
That anything done or omitted to be done by a corporation common carrier, subject to the 
Act to regulate commerce and the acts amendatory thereof, which, if done or omitted to 
be done by any director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee, agent, or person 
acting for or employed by such corporation, would constitute a misdemeanor under said 
Acts or under this Act shall also be held to be a misdemeanor committed by such 
corporation, and upon conviction thereof it shall be subject to like penalties as are 
prescribed in said Acts or by this Act, with reference to such persons, except as such 
penalties are herein changed. 
 
* * * * 
 
In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section the act, omission, or failure of 
any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any common carrier acting 
within the scope of his employment, shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, 
omission, or failure of such carrier as well as that of the person.
12
 
 
 The prosecution that gave rise to the New York Central case involved the payment of 
illegal rebates in violation of the requirement that railroads charge all shippers the same 
published rate.  New York Central’s manager and assistant traffic manager agreed to an illegal 
rebate of 5 cents off the published price of 23 cents per 100 pounds to ship large amounts of 
sugar from New York to Detroit.  The Supreme Court noted that without the rebate the sugar 
might have been sent by boat, and the lower price helped the shipper respond to “severe 
competition with other shippers and dealers.”13 
 
 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected New York Central’s claim that the imposition 
of criminal liability was unconstitutional because it punished innocent shareholders without due 
process, and its opinion endorsed corporate criminal liability and provided a standard for the 
imposition of such liability.  Acknowledging an early statement by Blackstone that a corporation 
cannot commit a crime, the Court commented that “modern authority” accepted corporate 
criminal liability, and it quoted with approval the following passage from an American criminal 
law treatise: 
 
Since a corporation acts by its officers and agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are 
just as much those of the corporation as are the things done. If, for example, the invisible, 
intangible essence or air which we term a corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, 
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lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can intend to do it, and can act 
therein as well viciously as virtuously.
14
 
 
The Court stated that the imposition of corporate criminal liability was critical to the success of 
the regulation of rates, and it rejected the idea that there was any impediment to this important 
legislation.  The opinion noted that the Elkins Act was adopted after the ICC published multiple 
reports stating that “statutes against rebates could not be effectually enforced so long as 
individuals only were subject to punishment for violation of the law, when the giving of rebates 
or concessions inured to the benefit of the corporations of which the individuals were but the 
instruments.”15  In reaching this result, the Court focused on the public policy benefit inherent in 
securing equal rights to interstate transportation with one generally accessible legal rate.  The 
Court also made it plain that it was not illegal–and was good public policy–to hold a corporation 
that had profited from a transaction responsible for the acts of the agents to whom it had 
entrusted the authority to act in connection with the setting of rates.  Since the great majority of 
business transactions and almost all interstate commerce were in the hands of corporations, 
giving the corporations immunity from criminal punishment because of what the Court 
characterized as “the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime” would 
effectively “take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting 
the abuses aimed at.”16  Since Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce to prevent 
favoritism was well established, it would be a distinct step backwards to accept the railroad’s 
arguments.   
 
 The opinion also established the federal standard for corporate criminal liability, 
extending the tort concept of respondeat superior.  As in tort law, the corporation may be held 
responsible for acts of the agent in the course of his employment when the act is done in whole 
or part for the benefit of the principal, here the corporation.  Rather than construing an agent’s 
powers strictly, the Court stated that a corporation is held responsible for acts an agent has 
“assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually 
authorized.”17  Under this standard, making and fixing rates was within the scope of authority of 
the general freight manager and the assistant freight managers, and New York Central was 
properly held liable for their acts.  The Court stated it was going “only a step farther” than the 
tort cases in holding that “the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to 
make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his 
act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the 
premises.”18 
 
B. The Historical and Utilitarian Roots of Corporate Criminal Liability  
                                                 
14
Id. at  492–93 (quoting BISHOP’S NEW CRIMINAL LAW § 417).  Bishop has been called 
“"the foremost law writer of the age.”  Stephen A. Seigel, "Bishop, Joel Prentiss," in the YALE 
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 The New York Central case reflects a utilitarian and pragmatic employment of criminal 
law by both Congress and the Supreme Court during a period of major social and economic 
change.  The unprecedented  concentration of economic power in corporations and combinations 
of business concerns (called “trusts”) that developed after the Civil War produced a demand for 
new laws–including criminal laws–to respond effectively to increasingly powerful corporate 
entities.  As one scholar noted, “[g]iven the absence of widespread public civil enforcement prior 
to the early 1900s, corporate criminal liability appears to have been the only available option that 
met both the need for public enforcement and the need for corporate liability.”19  The 1887 
Interstate Commerce Commission Act and the Elkins Act were enacted during the same period 
as the Sherman Act,
20
 the first federal statute to limit cartels and monopolies.  Like the Elkins 
Act, the Sherman Act applied to both natural and corporate persons;
21
 section 1 expressly 
provided for the imposition of felony penalties on a corporation for entering into combinations, 
trusts, or other conspiracies in restraint of trade.
22
   
 
 The Elkins Act was a response to the ICC’s claim that the absence of corporate criminal 
sanctions was a fatal flaw in critical regulatory legislation.  The facts of the prosecution that 
came before the Supreme Court vividly illustrated the problems described in the Commission’s 
1891 report.  The managers were acting for the benefit of the railroad, not their personal benefit, 
in granting the rebates.  It seems unlikely that the fine imposed upon the manager, $1,000 per 
violation, would have been an effective deterrent to similar actions by New York Central or its 
competitors.  Moreover, if only the employees had been prosecuted, the jurors might have balked 
at convicting them of a regulatory offense that benefitted only their corporate employer.  And, as 
the ICC feared, failure to hold the railroad responsible here would have threatened the legitimacy 
of the law and public respect for it.  In contrast, under the Elkins Act it was possible to prosecute 
both the railroad and the employees, and the railroad’s penalty was $18,000 for each violation, 
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the transfer of wealth from consumers to price fixers and monopolists or protecting non-
consumer interest groups such as small firms and farmers.  See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 58–61 (4th ed. 2011). 
21
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associations).  
22
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felonies).  The original act set the maximum punishment at a fine not exceeding $5,000 and 
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exceeding $100 million for a corporation, and imprisonment for up to three years and a fine not 
exceeding $350,000 for an individual). 
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for a total of $108,000.  Adjusted for inflation, this would be more than $4.5 million in 2012, a 
sum sufficient to get the attention of New York Central and its competitors. 
 
 New York Central was consistent with other Supreme Court decisions giving full effect to 
other critical aspects of the federal antitrust legislation adopted during this period.  Historians 
have noted that both public opinion and federal policy seem to have reached a turning point in 
the years immediately preceding the New York Central decision.  President Roosevelt took great 
interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and Congress appropriated special funds for 
enforcement and provided for expedited appeal of antitrust cases to the Supreme Court.
23
  
Although the Supreme Court’s first decision gave the Sherman Act a narrow reading that 
threatened its effectiveness, the Court then issued a series of decisions between 1897 and 1911 
upholding lower court decisions preventing mergers and breaking up the Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco trusts.
24
  The opinion in New York Central endorsed another critical aspect of 
the new legislative framework: 
 
Given the prominence of corporations in interstate commerce, their immense potential to 
do wrong, and the absence of other regulatory mechanisms, a powerful deterrent would 
have been lost by restricting criminal liability to agents. Individuals and organizations, it 
seemed, had few incentives without the prospect of vicarious liability. With joint and 
several liability, however, both the principal and its agents have a distinct risk of liability 
and, from this, a reciprocal incentive for law abidance.  
 
The simple-minded public policy that emerged in [New York Central] seemed ideal in its 
shared allocation of risks to both principal and agent. Corporate liability deters crime; it 
moves the risk of loss away from risk averse officers and directors toward the firm; it 
efficiently distributes liability risk between the firm and employees. Without significant 
entity liability or even shared liability, some argued, incentives would be seen as too 
weak to ensure an organizational commitment to law abidance.
25
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s extended discussion of public policy and its critical reference to 
“the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime” are also consistent 
with a view of law that rejects legal formalism and allows criminal as well as civil law to 
develop to meet the needs of the time.  Although he did not write the opinion in New York 
Central, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a member of the Court (and had been a member of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court when it decided the principal state case cited in New York 
Central).  Holmes is, of course, famous for the following statement: 
 
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
                                                 
23
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN 
TRADITION at 560-61 (1954). 
24
For a discussion of these cases, see id. at 445–77, 561–63.  
25
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unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had 
a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, 
and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of 
mathematics.
26
  
 
Holmes did not limit his analysis to civil law.  To the contrary, he argued that “the general 
principles of criminal and civil liability are the same.”27  He also stated that “prevention ... would 
seem to be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment,” and he urged that criminal law 
should abandon its traditional focus on mental culpability.
28
  The Court’s opinion in New York 
Central seems to follow these recommendations, basing corporate criminal liability on the same 
standard as civil tort liability, without any separate analysis of mens rea. 
 
 C. The Current Scope of Corporate Liability Under Federal Law 
 
 In general, federal criminal laws are applicable to corporations.  Some, like the Elkins 
Act, refer explicitly to corporations.  But other criminal statutes that make no reference to entity 
liability are governed by the definitional provisions of the United States Code, which state 
“unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies 
as well as individuals.”29 
 
 Although the only question presented in New York Central case was whether the 
imposition of corporate criminal liability under the Elkins Act would violate due process, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion was written far more broadly.  It has been understood to be a strong 
endorsement of corporate criminal liability and the respondeat superior test, which is now 
applied to other federal offenses in all federal courts.  Despite scholarly criticism, the federal 
courts have declined to narrow the standard of liability by requiring the government to prove that 
the corporation lacked effective policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by 
its employees.
30
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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).  
27
See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 176 (2000) (quoting THE 
COMMON LAW at 38). 
28
Id. at 107 (quoting THE COMMON LAW at 46, 49–50). 
29
1 U.S.C. § 1.  Pursuant to this definition, courts applying individual statutes generally 
hold corporations liable unless (1) to do so would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and 
(2) limiting corporate liability will not otherwise frustrate the statutory purpose.  Rowland v. Cal. 
Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199–200, 210–11 (1993). 
30
Both the district and appellate courts in United States v. Ionia Management S.A., 555 
F.3d 303, 310 (2d
 
Cir. 2009), rejected this argument, which was made by a high level group of 
amici seeking to use the prosecution as a test case for reform. 
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 Additionally, collective knowledge and action is sometimes invoked to impose corporate 
liability even when no individual has committed an offense.
31
  Under this theory, the knowledge 
and conduct of multiple employees is imputed, in the aggregate, to the corporate actor.
32
  For 
example, a corporation may be found to have knowledge of a particular fact when “one part of 
the corporation has half the information making up the item, and another part of the entity has 
the other half.”33  This doctrine allows the imposition of corporate criminal liability even when 
no individual employee or agent had the necessary mens rea.  The leading decision involved a 
bank’s failure to file U.S. Treasury reports on multiple transactions over $10,000.34  The 
customer in question made more than 30 withdrawals of amounts in excess of $10,000 in cash by 
simultaneous presenting a single teller with multiple checks that totaled more than $10,000.  The 
bank argued that no one employee had the necessary willful intent to violate the reporting 
requirements, because the tellers who conducted the transactions were unaware that the law 
required the reports to be filed, and the employees who knew of the reporting requirements did 
not know of the transactions.  Noting that corporations frequently compartmentalize information 
in smaller units, the court concluded that the aggregate of those components should be treated as 
the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation, regardless whether employees 
administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees 
administering another aspect of the operation.  The court refused to allow the bank to escape 
liability by pleading ignorance when its organizational structure prevented any one employee 
from comprehending the full import of the transactions. 
 
 In New York Central the Supreme Court did state in dicta that there are “some crimes 
which, in their nature, cannot be committed by corporations,”35 but there have been no federal 
decisions identifying such offenses.  To the contrary, corporate liability has been imposed for a 
very wide variety of federal offenses, including offenses–like the currency reporting prosecution 
noted above–that require specific intent.36 
                                                 
31
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987). 
32
Id. (“Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific 
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes 
the corporation's knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees 
administering one component of an operation know the specific activities of employees 
administering another aspect of the operation.”).   
33
In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
34
Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 847. 
35
N. Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,  494 (1909).  
36
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS, THEIR  OFFICERS AND AGENTS § 2.09 (2d ed. 1992) 
(describing extension of corporate criminal liability to a variety of specific intent crimes 
including contempt of court and various forms of conspiracy, including conspiring to violate 
state and federal antitrust laws).  Brickey’s three volume treatise explores corporate criminal 
liability for conspiracy, racketeering, various forms of fraud, foreign corrupt practices, violations 
  
10 
 
D. The Model Penal Code Alternative 
 
 Although it has not been adopted by Congress, several states have implemented a more 
limited form of corporate criminal liability based on the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code (MPC).
37
   With limited exceptions, the American Law Institute rejected respondeat 
superior but preserved a more limited role for corporate criminal liability.
38
  The MPC permits 
imposition of corporate criminal liability when “the commission of the offense was authorized, 
requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high 
managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or 
employment.”39  These actors’ role in the entity “make[s] it reasonable to assume their acts are in 
some substantial sense reflective of the policy of the corporate body,”40 and shareholders are 
likely to be in a position to bring pressure to bear to avoid liability.  The MPC also provides for a 
defense that the high managerial agent having supervisory authority “employed due diligence to 
prevent its commission.
41
  Since the purpose of a corporate fine is to encourage diligent 
supervision, where that diligence can be shown the entity should be exculpated absent a contrary 
legislative purpose.
42
 
II. Criticism of New York Central, Respondeat Superior, and Corporate Criminal Liability 
 The legal literature in the United States is generally critical of the decision in New York 
Central.  Some critics argue that the Court erred in endorsing corporate criminal liability, while 
others argue that such liability is justified, but only on a more limited basis. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the election laws, bribery, tax offenses, currency reporting offenses, money laundering, 
obstruction of justice, perjury, and false statements. 
37
Model Penal Code § 2.07 cmt. 2(a) nn.6 & 7 lists state laws that adopt various features 
of the proposed Code or are similar to the proposed code.  The research reflected in the 
Commentary ended in 1979.  
38
The Code permits the imposition of liability on the basis of respondeat superior if the 
offense is one outside the Model Code and “a legislative purpose to impose liability on 
corporations plainly appears.”  Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(a).  Liability may also be imposed 
whenever “offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative 
performance imposed on corporations by law.”  Id. § 2.07(1)(b).  
 The Commentary reveals that the Institute had little enthusiasm for corporate criminal 
liability, concluding that there are only a few situations in which criminal liability would add to 
the deterrence that flows from the potential for individual liability: juries had been reluctant to 
convict individual corporate agents for regulatory offenses, especially where the violation may 
have been produced by general pressure created, even unintentionally, by management, and in 
some cases entities were unjustly enriched as a result of offenses committed by their agents. 
Model Penal Code § 2.07 cmt. 2(c) at 336-39. 
39
Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c).  
40
Id., § 2.07 cmt. 2(c) at 339. 
41
Id., § 2.07(5). 
42
Id., § 2.07 cmt. 6. 
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A. General Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
 Many U.S. scholars and commentators have argued that U.S. law should abandon 
corporate criminal liability.   
 
 The most fundamental objection is that corporate criminal liability is inconsistent with 
the basic premises of criminal law.
43
  According to this view, the traditional forms and functions 
of criminal law are not applicable to artificial persons because they cannot in any meaningful 
sense have mens rea or be “guilty” of a criminal offense.  Moral responsibility is reserved for 
persons who possess certain capabilities, which are a prerequisite of moral desert and criminal 
punishment.
44
  Since corporations do not possess these capabilities, they are not proper subjects 
of criminal liability.  It is improper to convict a legal entity that has no free will or character, and 
thus “no soul to damn and no body to kick.”45  Additionally, corporations act only through their 
officers and employees, and holding an entity vicariously liable for the conduct of its agents and 
employees is inconsistent with the principle that an actor is responsible only for his own conduct 
and intent.  Imprisonment–a defining characteristic of criminal law–cannot be imposed on a 
corporation.  In reality, criminal penalties are imposed on innocent shareholders, and criminal 
liability also imposes unjustified costs on innocent employees, suppliers, and the community.  
Finally, employing the criminal law in this fashion is dangerous, because it obscures and dilutes 
the moral content of criminal law.
46
   
 
 Scholars have noted that the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge that the function of 
tort law–the compensation of individuals–is very different than the function of criminal law.47  
Indeed, the Supreme Court did not consider alternatives, such as imposing civil or administrative 
sanctions on the corporation, or prosecuting the individual corporate officers and employees.  
The Court, they have suggested, posed a false choice of criminal liability or no enforcement. 
 
                                                 
43
Adam Safwat and I have described this argument elsewhere as a “retributive critique.” 
Sara Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About 
American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 89, 97–98 
(2004).   
44
See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
596–617 (1997) (stating that the capacities necessary for moral personhood include rationality, 
autonomy, and emotionality, including the capacity to choose and cause the realization of one’s 
choice and mental states such as joy, fear, and anger).  
45
See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981). 
46
Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Process, the Vices of “Restorative 
Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 384-85 (2003) (commenting that extending criminal liability 
to corporations “risks obscuring the moral content of criminal liability”). 
47
See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1114–20 (1992). 
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 More recently, law and economics scholars have developed a second line of attack on 
corporate criminal liability, arguing that criminal sanctions are not an efficient response to 
corporate misconduct.  According to this view, the combination of corporate civil liability and 
individual criminal liability are sufficient so there is no need for corporate criminal liability, 
which is less efficient.  Society must bear higher sanctioning costs for stigma penalties as well as 
increased costs for the procedural protections of criminal law.
48
  The potential for both civil and 
criminal penalties may over deter ex ante and result in excessive litigation costs ex post.
49
  Other 
scholars have taken the economic analysis one step further, arguing a regime of strict respondeat 
superior liability can present corporations with perverse and potentially conflicting incentives.
50
  
Specifically, the costs of enforcement combined with the possibility of  heavy criminal penalties 
may encourage corporations to cover up  illegal activity. Although a simple economic approach 
suggests that higher sanctions will lead directly to lower corporate crime, it fails to take account 
of the corporation enforcement expenditures in detecting and investigating crimes committed by 
its employees and agents.  Successful detection and investigation exposes the corporation to the 
potential of  heavy criminal penalties intended to deter crime. 
52
  
 
B. New Justifications for Corporate Criminal Liability and Proposals for Reform 
 
  Many U.S. scholars now accept the legitimacy of some form of corporate criminal 
liability, but argue that respondeat superior is overbroad.  This scholarship first identifies a 
variety of functions served by corporate criminal liability, and then proposes standards for 
liability that incorporate those functions. 
 
1. New justifications for corporate liability 
 The modern scholarship defending corporate criminal liability–like the New York Central 
decision–rests first on a recognition of the dangers posed by the enormous power now wielded 
by corporations and the potential for harm to the U.S. economy and the health and safety of its 
citizens.  Both U.S. corporations and foreign corporations conducting business in the United 
States have been implicated in wide range of serious misconduct.  
 
Modern corporations not only wield virtually unprecedented power, but they do so in a 
fashion that often causes serious harm to both individuals and to society as a whole. In 
                                                 
48
See, e.g., V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (examining the reputational and procedural costs in the 
corporate context). 
49
Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321 
(1996). 
50
Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994).  
52
This analysis, however, leaves open the door for some forms of corporate criminal 
liability.  For a discussion that compares various regimes of corporate criminal liability, see 
generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis 
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
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some recent cases, corporate misconduct and malfeasance destabilized the stock market 
and led to the loss of billions in shareholder equity and the loss of tens (or perhaps even 
hundreds) of thousands of jobs. Enron was the seventh-most valuable company in the 
U.S., until the revelation of its use of deceptive accounting devices to shift debt off its 
books and hide corporate losses led to losses of more than $100 billion in shareholder 
equity before it filed for bankruptcy. But Enron was not alone in the use of fraudulent 
accounting practices. The revelation of similar misconduct by other corporations 
(including Dynergy, Adelphia Communications, WorldCom, and Global Crossing) also 
led to massive losses.  Federal prosecutors have also uncovered widespread wrongdoing 
in other industries, though the nature of the violations has varied over time. In the past 
decade, virtually every major pharmaceutical company has pled guilty to or settled 
charges arising out of serious misconduct.  In the previous decade, the 1990s, the most 
prominent cases concerned antitrust violations. The largest single fine imposed was $500 
million for a worldwide scheme to fix the price of vitamins, and fines from the nine most 
serious antitrust cases of the decade totaled $1.2 billion.  
 
Because of their size, complexity, and control of vast resources, corporations have the 
ability to engage in misconduct that dwarfs that which could be accomplished by 
individuals. For example, Siemens, the German engineering giant, paid more than $1.4 
billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and 
Latin America, using its slush funds to secure public works contracts around the world.  . 
. . U.S. investigators found that the use of bribes and kickbacks were not anomalies, but 
the corporation’s standard operating procedure and part of its business strategy.53  
 
 Modern scholars have articulated new theories of corporate culpability that can serve as a 
basis for criminal liability (though as noted below, not liability based on respondeat superior).  
This scholarship emphasizes two points.  First, institutions have an enormous impact on 
individual behavior, and second, corporations vary significantly and produce very different 
institutional effects.  Scholars have turned to research on topics such as organizational behavior
54
 
and social psychology
55
 to demonstrate the profound impact organizations have on the behavior 
of individuals.  The fundamental insight is that “institutions do produce wrongdoing.”56  Values 
from institutions and groups are internalized, and organizational processes can create a moral and 
intellectual setting that encourages unlawful behavior.  A variety of psychological processes may 
contribute, including a diffused sense of responsibility, a desire to remain in harmony with others 
in a group setting, and the effects of cognitive dissonance.  As one psychologist stated, many 
criminal acts are “essentially organizational products that result when complex social forces 
                                                 
53
Sara Sun Beale, A Response to Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1481, 1483–84 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
54
Bucy, supra note 47, at 1123-28. 
55
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
494–497 (2006).   
56
Id. at 493 (emphasis in original). 
  
14 
interact to cause individuals to commit multiple acts of terrible harm.”57  Equally important, each 
corporation has a distinctive combination of formal and informal characteristics that can promote 
or discourage violations of the law.
58
   
 
 Because corporations are not merely the sites at which individual wrongdoing occurs, but 
may properly be said (at least in some cases) to have produced the wrongdoing, a corporation 
may itself be culpable, and properly subject to criminal sanctions.  Indeed, some scholars argue 
that the imposition of criminal sanctions is critically important.  They contend that the expressive 
function of criminal law requires that corporations be subject to criminal prosecution.   
Criminal sanctions condemn in order to reify (and sometimes shift) societal norms.
59
  From the 
public’s perspective, not prosecuting corporations is the equivalent of immunizing them.   
Immunizing corporations from criminal liability would violate strongly held societal norms, at a 
significant cost to the legitimacy of the legal system.  Communication retributivism also requires 
that corporations be subject to criminal liability.
60
  Because the breach of collective social norms 
sends a message that the offender’s moral worth is greater than that of the victim, society must 
impose a penalty to send a corrective message and  reinforce its moral norms.  Both wronged 
individuals and other members of society seek retributive justice, which only  criminal law can 
provide.
61
  These principles apply to corporations, because evidence suggests most Americans 
understand them to have individual and unique corporate cultures embodied in their actions, 
practices, and words.
62
   
 
 The expressive function of the law can also be harnessed to provide deterrence.  The 
established social practice of blaming institutions provides a basis for the imposition of corporate 
criminal liability.
63
  This social practice reflects common beliefs about institutional responsibility 
that are well founded.  Because the legal system has a monopoly on an important and strong 
form of normative expression, legal judgments of entity fault have a significant impact, 
conveying to the market that the corporation may be “flawed, unreliable, and apt to generate 
future harm”64  Entity liability’s powerful flow through effects on individuals can also help shape 
preferences and thereby deter criminality.   
 
                                                 
57
Id. at 495 (quoting John Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into 
Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, 13, 13–14 
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenburnsel eds., 1996)). 
58
Bucy, supra note 47, 1123-33; see also Buell, supra note 55, at 529.  
59
Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 
49 (2012). 
60
Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41 
STETSON L. REV. 73, 91–94 (2011). 
61
Id. at 94. 
62
Id. at 93. 
63
See generally Buell, supra note 55 (arguing that the blaming function of entity criminal 
liability is closely linked to the utility of corporate criminal law) 
64
Id. at 501. 
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 Additionally, the application of the criminal law to corporations provides a basis for the 
rehabilitation or reform of corporations that are proper subjects of expressive punishment.
65
  
Focused on the future, rehabilitation seeks to ensure that the defendant becomes a law abiding 
members of society.  Unlike a defense of due diligence (which can be satisfied by the presence of 
a compliance program at the time of the alleged offense), a focus on rehabilitation asks whether 
the organization needs to change now to prevent future violations.  Focusing on rehabilitation 
may affect both the need for a prosecution and the types of sanctions that should be imposed in 
the case of conviction including, for example, corporate probation.
 66
  Indeed, the potential for 
corporate criminal liability may be a critical mechanism to bring about structural reform within 
individual corporations, and even more generally across whole industries.
67
   
 
 Other supporters of corporate criminal liability point to major shortcomings in the 
alternative methods of deterrence.  For example, it might theoretically  be more efficient to 
impose the same fines on a corporation in an administrative or civil proceeding.  But these 
alternatives may be compromised or unavailable.  Regulatory capture can undermine the 
potential for adequate administrative or civil enforcement.
68
  Private litigation by investors is 
now disfavored under the federal securities law,
69
 and corporate law now makes it very difficult 
to hold directors and officers personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.
70
  Restrictions 
on class actions and punitive damages have a similar effect in reducing the avenues for civil 
redress.  These restrictions on the availability of civil alternatives suggest a need for caution in 
eliminating or reducing the possibility of criminal liability. 
 
 Finally, commentators have recognized that the potential for corporate criminal liability 
may positively affect  other enforcement mechanisms.  As discussed in Section III, corporations 
facing the potential for criminal liability have significant incentives to assist with the 
investigation of individual wrong doing and settle civil claims. 
 
2. Proposals for Reform 
 
 Although the new scholarship has identified justifications for corporate criminal liability 
generally, it also argues that these justifications require limitations on the scope of liability.   
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Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1428–30 (2009). 
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a. Restructuring the Standard for Liability to Address Corporate Intent and Vicarious 
Liability 
 Some scholars have attempted to define a standard of corporate liability based on the 
entity’s own conduct and intent, aiming to align criminal responsibility with the features of 
corporations that induce or inhibit criminal conduct.  One proposal based liability on “corporate 
ethos.” Central to this approach is the assumption that an entity possesses a distinct and 
identifiable personality independent of specific individuals who control or work for the 
organization.
71
  Under the corporate ethos standard, the government could convict a corporation 
only if it proved that the corporate ethos encouraged agents of the corporation to commit the 
criminal act.  Another proposal based liability on “constructive corporate fault,” focusing on 
whether “aspects of the organization, such as policies, goals, and practices, that reflect not 
merely the sum total of individual agents’ intentions, but instead attributes and conditions of the 
corporation that make it possible for these agents to cooperate and collaborate in legally 
problematic ways.”72  Under this standard, the question is whether the primary act was “authored 
by” the corporation in a meaningful sense, such as whether the agent’s acts can be fairly said to 
be the actions of the corporation based on objective factors such as the size, complexity, 
formality, functionality, decision making process, and structure of the corporate organization.   
 
 Like the MPC, these proposals seek to limit corporate liability to conduct that can be said 
to reflect the corporation’s policies, but they do so by taking into account a much wider range of 
factors.  The MPC limits liability to conduct that was authorized, performed, or recklessly 
tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent.  This standard would not permit 
liability encouraged by clear corporate policies absent direct participation by the board or a high 
managerial agent.  Indeed, the MPC standard may create a perverse incentive for senior 
managers; it encourages ignorance rather than diligence because liability attaches only if the 
manager was aware of and recklessly tolerated the conduct.
73
   
 
 It is doubtful, however, whether these proposals are practical, and critics have questioned 
whether they effectively describe the functional relationship between the institution and the 
crimes of individuals.
74
  They have not been adopted by U.S. courts or legislatures. 
 
 b. Creating a Defense of Due Diligence 
 Many critics who identify the absence of fault or desert as the critical defect in the 
respondeat superior standard of criminal liability agree with one aspect of the Model Penal Code: 
respondeat superior should be supplemented with a defense of good faith or due diligence.
75
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Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1309 (2000). 
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Notions of desert, deterrence, and the expressive function of law may support these proposals. 
Proponents argue that such a defense is necessary to ensure that criminal liability is imposed 
only in cases of true corporate fault.  Because a good faith defense imposes liability only when 
there is a basis to condemn the corporation as a whole, it prevents an expressive failure that 
would undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
76
  Additionally, a defense of due 
diligence could provide a desirable incentive for corporations to monitor their agents and thus 
prevent wrongdoing.  Alternatively, some critics of respondeat superior suggest shifting  the 
burden of proof on this issue, requiring the government to prove the corporation did not have 
reasonable policies and procedures to prevent employee misconduct.
77
   
 
 Skeptics have noted, however, that there is little evidence that compliance programs are 
effective.  They contend that a due diligence or compliance-based organizational liability regime 
could lead to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, 
second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures.
78
 
 
c. Narrowing Respondeat Superior’s Focusing on the Intent of the Agent  
Another proposal also seeks to harness corporate criminal liability’s expressive function 
by narrowing its reach to cases of true entity blameworthiness.  Based on the conclusion that 
first-best solutions intended to directly measure corporate ethos or constructive corporate fault 
are not workable, this approach seeks a workable alternative that limits respondeat superior while 
not being unduly narrow.
79
  The MPC focus on management fault is unsatisfactory, because 
lower level employees may cause serious harm because of institutional norms, and formal 
policies may not reflect institutional realities.  Accordingly, criminal liability should be tailored 
to impose fault on the entity only if the agent acted primarily with intent to benefit the firm. By 
focusing on the agent’s mental state toward the firm, this approach aims to better capture action 
influenced by the corporate institution.  
 
III. The Evolving Enforcement of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 Although the doctrine of corporate criminal liability remains unaffected by the criticisms 
described in Section II, both the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the standards for 
sentencing have been significantly modified to address these critiques.  The principles that guide 
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the decision whether to prosecute and the sanctions that are imposed on corporations that are 
convicted now focus on corporate culpability and seek to prevent future wrongdoing, advance 
other social goals (such as restitution to victims), and minimize undesirable social costs.  These 
practices substantially narrow the real scope of corporate criminal responsibility and reduce the 
pressure for doctrinal change. 
 
A. The Administrative Standards Governing Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
 The Principles of Federal Prosecution—set forth in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 
(USAM)—provide guidance for the exercise of federal prosecutors’ charging discretion.  The 
USAM contains both general standards applicable to all cases, and specific provisions governing 
the prosecution of corporations and other business entities.  The general standard, USAM § 9-
27.220, states that federal prosecutors should recommend prosecution when they believe conduct 
constitutes a federal crime and the admissible evidence will be sufficient for conviction, unless 
no federal interest would be served by prosecution, the person is subject to effective prosecution 
in another district, or there are adequate non-criminal alternatives to prosecution.
80
  Subsequent 
portions of the USAM state that in all cases federal prosecutors should consider: 
 
1. Federal law enforcement priorities; 
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense; 
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution; 
4. The person's culpability in connection with the offense; 
5. The person's history with respect to criminal activity; 
6. The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution 
of others; and 
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.81 
 
                                                 
80
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.220, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-27.220 
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time the Department establishes national investigative and prosecutorial priorities. 
These priorities are designed to focus Federal law enforcement efforts on those 
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and are most likely to be handled effectively at the Federal level. In addition, 
individual United States Attorneys may establish their own priorities, within the 
national priorities, in order to concentrate their resources on problems of 
particular local or regional significance. 
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These general provisions have been supplemented with the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations in the United States (Principles of Federal Prosecution).
82
 
The Principles of Federal Prosecution make it clear that federal prosecutors should not bring 
criminal charges merely because a case can be made on the basis of respondeat superior.  Rather, 
prosecutors must consider a variety of factors that identify corporate blameworthiness and assess 
the adequacy of alternatives to federal prosecution, including those deemed most important by 
the critics of respondeat superior. The Principles of Federal Prosecution seem to mimic or adopt 
the moral culpability analysis recommended by scholars.
83
 
 
 The Principles of Federal Prosecution state: 
 
. . . In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating 
plea or other agreements, prosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a 
decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate target: 
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, 
and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of 
corporations for particular categories of crime; 
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity 
in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; 
3. the corporation's history of similar misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and 
regulatory enforcement actions against it; 
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents; 
5. the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing compliance 
program; 
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective 
corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace 
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, 
and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies; 
7. collateral consequences, including whether there is disproportionate harm to 
shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven personally 
culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution; 
                                                 
82
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8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's 
malfeasance; and 
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.84 
Several of these factors address key aspects of corporate culpability that are not relevant to the 
bare test of respondeat superior: the seriousness of the harm done, the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the corporation (including the role of management), the history of similar 
misconduct, and the existence and effectiveness of any pre-existing compliance program.   
The US Attorney manual states that the decision whether a corporation should be held 
criminally responsible does not turn solely on the application of respondeat superior, and “it may 
not be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust 
compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the single isolated act 
of a rogue employee.”85  The accompanying commentary also addresses the role and conduct of 
management, characterizing it as “the most important” of the factors because “a corporation is 
directed by its management and management is responsible for a corporate culture in which 
criminal conduct is either discouraged or tacitly encouraged.”86 These factors bring federal 
practice close to the standards proposed by many critics of respondeat superior. 
The Principles of Federal Prosecution require prosecutors to give weight to another factor 
deemed critical by commentators: the existence of a corporate compliance program.
87
  The 
commentary recognizes that good faith efforts to comply with the law may show a lack of 
organizational culpability or alternatively, the compliance program  may be no more than 
ineffective window dressing. Accordingly, prosecutors are instructed to consider “whether the 
program is adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting 
wrongdoing by employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the program or is 
tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business 
objectives.”88  In evaluating the adequacy of the program, prosecutors should consider the 
program’s design, implementation, review, and revisions; whether there was a sufficient staff to 
audit and analyze the compliance efforts; and whether employees were adequately informed. 
The Principles of Federal Prosecution also address the criticism that civil or administrative 
enforcement may be preferable to criminal prosecution, and that criminal sanctions may impose 
unwarranted penalties on innocent parties, including shareholders as well as members of the 
general public.  Prosecutors are instructed to consider the adequacy of prosecuting only the 
responsible individuals and whether non-criminal alternatives, such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions, “would adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate a corporation that has 
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 Id., § 9-28.500(B). 
87
 Id., § 9-28.800(B) ( noting, however, that a compliance program “that specifically 
prohibited the very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal 
liability.”). 
88
 Id. 
  
21 
engaged in wrongful conduct.”89  This evaluation requires case by case consideration of the need 
for criminal sanctions, including an evaluation of the other sanctions that are available, the 
likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed, and other factors such as the strength of the 
regulatory authority’s interest.90 
Prosecutors are also instructed to consider “collateral consequences” of a corporate criminal 
conviction, taking into account “the possibly substantial consequences to a corporation's 
employees, investors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom may, depending on the size and 
nature of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played no role in the criminal 
conduct, have been unaware of it, or have been unable to prevent it.”91  Because such factors will 
exist to some degree in every corporate prosecution, prosecutors are encouraged to weigh the 
collateral consequences in light of other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the harm and 
pervasiveness of misconduct.
92
 
Finally, prosecutors are instructed to consider several factors concerning post offense 
conduct including whether the corporation cooperated in the investigation and has made 
restitution or taken other remedial actions.
93
  The Principles of Federal Prosecution treat these 
remedial actions as factors that help to measure corporate character or culpability, stating in the 
commentary that: 
A corporation's response to misconduct says much about its willingness to ensure that such 
misconduct does not recur. Thus, corporations that fully recognize the seriousness of their 
misconduct and accept responsibility for it should be taking steps to implement the 
personnel, operational, and organizational changes necessary to establish an awareness 
among employees that criminal conduct will not be tolerated.
94
 
As a result, prosecutors consider the integrity and credibility of the corporation’s remedial and 
disciplinary procedures, and whether a corporation appropriately disciplined wrongdoers once 
they were been identified.  Quick recognition of flaws in a compliance program and changes to 
that program are also relevant.  A closely related mitigating factor affecting the decision to 
prosecute is a corporation’s “timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its cooperation 
with the government's investigation.”95  It is often difficult for outside investigators to determine 
which individuals took action on behalf of the corporation and find the relevant evidence, so the 
USAM gives weight to “the corporation's willingness to provide relevant information and 
evidence and identify relevant actors within and outside the corporation, including senior 
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executives.”96 This cooperation may be especially beneficial to both the government and the 
corporation, because without the corporation’s assistance there may be a protracted investigation 
that would disrupt the corporation’s business operations.  
 The Principles of Federal Prosecution also recognize that in some cases there is another 
option in corporate cases—a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement—that avoids the 
necessity for a prosecutor to charge or not charge: 
. . . [W]here the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction for innocent third 
parties would be significant, it may be appropriate to consider a non-prosecution or 
deferred prosecution agreement with conditions designed, among other things, to promote 
compliance with applicable law and to prevent recidivism. Such agreements are a third 
option, besides a criminal indictment, on the one hand, and a declination, on the other. 
Declining prosecution may allow a corporate criminal to escape without consequences. 
Obtaining a conviction may produce a result that seriously harms innocent third parties 
who played no role in the criminal conduct. Under appropriate circumstances, a deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution agreement can help restore the integrity of a company's 
operations and preserve the financial viability of a corporation that has engaged in 
criminal conduct, while preserving the government's ability to prosecute a recalcitrant 
corporation that materially breaches the agreement. Such agreements achieve other 
important objectives as well, like prompt restitution for victims. Ultimately, the 
appropriateness of a criminal charge against a corporation, or some lesser alternative, 
must be evaluated in a pragmatic and reasoned way that produces a fair outcome, taking 
into consideration, among other things, the Department's need to promote and ensure 
respect for the law.
97
 
Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) are discussed 
below. 
B. The Impact of the Administrative Standards Governing Federal Prosecutions 
Although respondeat superior seems to permit a corporate prosecution whenever a rogue 
employee violated the law, the discretionary approach under the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution has substantially narrowed the effective reach of corporate liability.  From 2007 to 
2012, fewer than 200 corporations were convicted per year in the federal courts.
98
  
 
Though the number of corporate prosecutions is quite small, the potential for corporate 
criminal liability nonetheless has a dramatic effect on corporate conduct, providing a powerful 
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incentive for corporate cooperation.  Rather than oppose government investigations, corporations 
help build the case against individual wrongdoers and settle claims against the corporation itself.  
Because the Principles of Federal Prosecution treat corporate cooperation as a substantial factor 
weighing against prosecution, U.S. corporations that receive reports of suspicious activity 
generally bring in counsel to conduct a rigorous internal investigation and require their officers 
and employees to cooperate with the internal investigation.  If the internal investigation uncovers 
wrongdoing, it is generally to the corporation’s advantage to inform the government of the 
relevant information and negotiate a settlement that avoids or minimizes the entity’s criminal 
liability.   
 
Settlements take several forms.  In many cases, corporations avoid criminal liability but 
accept civil liability and pay significant fines.
99
  In other cases, negotiated guilty pleas also settle 
civil and administrative charges.  In 2009, for example, Pfizer Inc. and a subsidiary agreed to pay 
$2.3 billion, the largest health care fraud settlement in the history of the Department of Justice, to 
resolve criminal and civil liability arising from the illegal promotion of certain pharmaceutical 
products.
100
  The settlement included a criminal fine of $1.195 billion and forfeiture of $105 
million, along with a payment of $1 billion to resolve allegations under the civil False Claims 
Act and provide $102 million to civil claimants.
101
  Some federal settlements also resolve state 
charges.
102
 
 
 Alternatively, the Department of Justice and a corporation may settle criminal, civil, and 
administrative charges by entering into a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or non-
prosecution agreement (NPA).  A DPA requires judicial approval.  An information charging the 
offense and the DPA are filed with and must be approved by a federal district court.  In contrast, 
NPAs do not require court approval and typically nothing is filed.  Since 2000, the Department 
of Justice has entered into 257 publicly disclosed DPAs and NPAs, and it is thought that there 
have been others that were not publicized.
103
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These agreements frequently include provisions that the court could not require without 
the defendant’s agreement.  For example, BP’s guilty plea agreement104 arising from the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico included a fine of $4 billion, including $2.4 
billion dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving and conserving the marine and coastal 
environments, ecosystems and bird and wildlife habitat, and $350 million to fund research, 
development, education and training to be conducted by the National Academy of Sciences.
105
  
The agreement also included the appointment of process safety and ethics monitors. 
Employing DPAs and NPAs, the Department of Justice has brought “structural reform 
prosecutions,” aimed at the adoption of sweeping internal corporate reforms.106  Using these 
techniques, the Department has obtained “demanding settlements” from corporations including 
AIG, American Online, Boeing, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Computer Associates, HealthSouth, 
KPMG, MCI, Merrill Lynch & Co, and Monsanto, as well as several public entities.
107
 
 
 Although the Principles of Federal Prosecution and the use of DPAs and NPAs seek to 
align corporate criminal liability with culpability and to employ criminal liability to promote a 
variety of social goals, the government’s practices have been subject to a variety of criticisms. 
Some critics charge that broad entity liability under respondeat superior imposes undue pressure 
on corporations and undermines fundamental rights, including the right to counsel.  
Corporations, it is said, have been forced to become part of the prosecutorial team.
108
  But other  
critics take the opposite view, arguing that the government has not been sufficiently aggressive 
in prosecuting either corporations or their employees for misconduct in connection with the 
financial crisis of 2008.  One former federal prosecutor argues the practice of seeking corporate 
cooperation and structural reforms has displaced efforts to prosecute individuals and 
significantly undermined deterrence: 
 
Although it is supposedly justified because it prevents future crimes, I suggest that the 
future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs the 
prophylactic benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are often little more 
than window-dressing. Just going after the company is also both technically and morally 
suspect. It is technically suspect because, under the law, you should not indict or threaten 
to indict a company unless you can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some 
managerial agent of the company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove that, 
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why not indict the manager? And from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and its 
many innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed by some 
unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to elementary notions of moral responsibility.
109
  
 
On the other hand, there has also been criticism of the Department of Justice’s failure to 
prosecute any banks for their role in the financial crisis.
110
 
 
C. Corporate Sentencing 
 
 The advisory Sentencing Guidelines
 
provide comprehensive recommendations for 
organizational sentencing in the federal courts,
111
 including not only fines but also remedial 
measures, and probation. The Guidelines tailor the fines to corporate culpability (not bare 
criminality) and provide for other non-punitive remedial measures and measures intended to 
reform the corporation and decrease the likelihood of future offenses.  The Guidelines were 
“designed so that the sanctions imposed upon organizations and their agents, taken together, will 
provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain 
internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”112 
 
1. Fine determination 
 
 Under the Guidelines, fine amounts are largely a function of organizational culpability.  
Except in the rare case of a wholly criminal organization (which is to be divested of all its 
assets
113
), the Guidelines provide that “the fine range . . .  should be based on the seriousness of 
the offense and the culpability of the organization.”114  To determine culpability, the Guidelines 
assign a numerical score, based on specified aggravating and mitigating factors, that allows 
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courts to calculate a recommended fine range.
115
  The Guidelines instruct the courts to consider a 
range of factors: 
 
The seriousness of the offense generally will be reflected by the greatest of the 
pecuniary gain, the pecuniary loss, or the amount in a guideline offense level fine 
table.  Culpability generally will be determined by six factors that the sentencing 
court must consider.  The four factors that increase the ultimate punishment of an 
organization are:  (i) the involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the 
prior history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an order; and (iv) the 
obstruction of justice.  The two factors that mitigate the ultimate punishment of an 
organization are:  (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; 
and (ii) self-reporting, cooperation, or acceptance of responsibility.
116
 
 
When selecting a fine within the recommended range, courts are encouraged to weigh policy 
factors including the seriousness of the offense, the nature of the organization’s involvement, the 
collateral consequences of conviction, the involvement of a vulnerable victim, whether the 
offense resulted in nonpecuniary damages, and whether the corporation or its high-level 
personnel have a history of civil or criminal misconduct.
117
  The Guidelines also provide for a 
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lesser fine if necessary to “avoid substantially jeopardizing the continued viability of the 
organization.”118   
 
 Upward or downward departures and variances from the Guidelines range are permitted 
in individual cases.
119
  The Guidelines identify factors “[not] adequately taken into consideration 
by the guidelines” which might warrant upward or downward departure from the recommended 
range on an individual basis.
120
  An upward departure may be warranted if the organization is 
exceptionally culpable
121
 or if the offense involved official corruption,
122
 caused a risk of death 
or bodily injury,
123
 or caused a threat to national security,
124
 the environment,
125
 or a market.
126
.  
A downward departure may be warranted if the organization provides substantial assistance to 
authorities in the prosecution of other offenders,
127
 the organization is a public entity,
128
 the 
victims of the crime were members or beneficiaries of the organization,
129
 or the organization 
has agreed to pay remedial costs that greatly exceed the organization’s criminal gain.130 
 
2. Compliance Programs 
 
 Under the Guidelines, an “Effective Compliance and Ethics Program” in place at the time 
of the offence generally reduces a corporation’s culpability score.131  This reduction does not 
apply, however, if the organization “unreasonably delayed reporting the offense”132 or if high-
level corporate officials “participated in, condoned, or [were] willfully ignorant of the 
offense.”133  Additionally, in selecting a fine within the culpability range, courts are encouraged 
to select a higher fine if the organization failed to have such a program at the time of the 
offence.
134
  Finally, an upward departure from the guidelines may be warranted to offset the 
corporation’s score reduction under § 8C2.5(f) if the program was “implemented . . . in response 
to a court order or administrative order specifically directed at the organization.”135  
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3. Probation 
 
 In felony cases, the Guidelines provide for one to five years of corporate probation.
136
  In 
all other cases, probation of up to five years is appropriate
137
 where necessary “to ensure that 
another sanction will be fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the 
organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”138  In determining the 
conditions of probation, the Guidelines advise courts to “consider the views” of governmental 
regulatory bodies responsible for supervising the organization’s conduct.139  In Fiscal Year 2012, 
72.2% of organizational offenders were placed on probation.
140
  
 
 In addition to criminal sanctions, administrative penalties are available for a variety of 
industry-specific offences.  Sanctions may include civil monetary penalties, asset forfeiture,
141
 
loss of licenses or permits, and suspension/debarment from government contracts or 
nonprocurement programs.
142
  For example, in the context of Medicare fraud, a Programs of All-
Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) beneficiary organization that furnishes false information 
in violation of § 460.40(f) may be subject to suspension of PACE enrollment, suspension of 
benefit payments, monetary penalties of $100,000 per falsification, a corrective action plan or 
termination of the PACE program agreement.
143
  These sanctions may be imposed in addition to 
criminal sanctions for the same unlawful conduct.
144
  
 
4. Remedial measures 
 
 The Guidelines provide that, whenever possible, corporate sentencing should include 
non-punitive, remedial measures aimed at making the victims whole.
145
  Courts may order 
organizations to give notice to victims
146
 and to make monetary or in-kind restitution.
147
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Organizations may be subject to remedial orders such as product recalls and environmental 
clean-up orders.
148
  They may be ordered to perform community service if they are “uniquely” 
competent to repair the harm caused.
149
  Community service requirements must be “reasonably 
designed to repair the harm caused by the offense.”150  Additionally, courts may require, as a 
condition to probation, an “effective compliance and ethics program” designed to “prevent and 
detect criminal conduct” and promote an ethical corporate culture. 151  In Fiscal Year 2012, 
compliance programs were ordered in 35.5% of all corporate crime cases.
152
   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Despite the persistence of the doctrine of respondeat superior, federal criminal law does 
not impose crippling criminal penalties whenever a rogue employee engages in criminal conduct.  
The practice of corporate criminal liability has evolved in ways that address the principal 
critiques of respondeat superior.  Prosecutorial discretion focuses on corporate culpability and 
cooperation, and these factors also guide organizational sentencing.  However, as the federal 
system now operates, the breadth of potential liability generates significant pressure to cooperate 
at the investigative stage, and to settle when wrongdoing is uncovered.  Accordingly, critics now 
call for procedural reforms as well as changes in the doctrine of corporate liability.  
 
 The persistence of the doctrine of respondeat-superior-based corporate criminal liability 
and its limitation in practice shed light on three key aspects federal criminal law.  First, the 
Sentencing Guidelines have served as a more limited substitute for comprehensive criminal code 
reform.  Second, the federal justice system lacks the resources to process the vast majority of 
cases falling under the criminal code, and prosecutorial discretion is relied upon to select a small 
fraction of cases for prosecution.  Finally, like corporations, all defendants receive incentives for 
cooperation that may effectively compel them to plead guilty and/or assist in the investigation 
and prosecution of others. 
 
Like corporate criminal liability, the entire federal criminal code has long been the 
subject of harsh criticism and calls for comprehensive code reform.  Although the code reform 
efforts failed, they eventually gave birth to more limited sentencing reform.  The federal code 
has been called “a mess”153 and “a disgrace.”154  Indeed, virtually no one tries to defend the 
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federal criminal code, which is actually a haphazard compilation (rather than a unified code) of 
offenses enacted over two hundred years.  The unsystematic statutory penalties reflect the code’s 
haphazard growth.  The federal code is unquestionably overbroad in several respects: it includes 
duplicative and overlapping laws, laws that are not well defined, laws that encroach on matters 
better left to the states, and laws that criminalize conduct better left to civil law.
155
  Indeed, no 
one knows exactly how many federal crimes there are, though it is likely more than 4,000.
156
  
Additionally, in many respects federal criminal law is not tailored to limit liability to cases of 
true fault or blameworthiness.  The federal insanity defense, standards for federal accomplice 
liability, and definition of federal weapons and immigration offenses are all examples of 
doctrines that fail to tailor criminal liability to blameworthiness or moral guilt.
157
   
 
Despite widespread recognition of these serious problems, Congress has been unable to 
pass comprehensive criminal code reform
158
 and it has effectively abandoned the effort.  In its 
place, Congress enacted the legislation authorizing the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which have 
served as a more limited substitute for reform of the code itself.
159
  To bring about rational and 
proportionate sentencing, the Sentencing Commission adopted a modified “real offense” 
approach that gives significant weight to facts that are not elements of the offense charged but 
were considered to be relevant to the proper sentence.
160
  The Guidelines applicable to individual 
defendants rely heavily on non-statutory factors such as the amount of loss, the number and type 
of victims, and whether a weapon was used.  Similarly, the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines also employ non-statutory factors—such as the harm caused, the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the organization, and whether there was an effective compliance program—
to tailor punishment to culpability and harm.
161
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 Similarly prosecutorial discretion, which plays a critical role in corporate cases, is equally 
important in cases involving individual defendants.  Heavy reliance on prosecutorial discretion is 
a consequence of the dramatic mismatch between the very broad scope of federal criminal 
jurisdiction and the relatively small size of the Department of Justice and the federal judicial 
system.
162
  Federal authorities have the resources to prosecute only a tiny fraction of the offenses 
that fall within the terms of many federal criminal statutes.  As both the courts have recognized, 
absent action by Congress the only solution to imbalance between prosecutorial resources and 
possible defendants is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has stated that “Whether to prosecute and what charge to file . . . are decisions that generally rest 
in the prosecutor's discretion.”163 To preserve that discretion, the Court has erected substantial 
barriers to judicial review of prosecutorial decision making.
164
  
 
As a leading commentator explained, the federal system’s reliance on prosecutorial 
discretion has created an administrative criminal justice system that offers an alternative to full 
enforcement of a far narrower code: 
 
The public may also want a system in which, within broadly defined zones of anti-social 
conduct, law enforcement officials set priorities and move resources effectively from one 
area to another depending on social need.  Full enforcement of all social norms, even if it 
were otherwise desirable, would be very expensive. Moreover, the social cost of 
aggregate violations of any particular statute is not a constant, but rises and falls 
depending on the frequency and seriousness of violations at any given time, and the 
relative importance attached to the norm at different times. 
. . . .  
[T]he limited resources of the criminal justice system represent a choice, not a necessity, 
and it is a choice made with the understanding that specialized agencies will, subject to 
political control, allocate priorities in a sensible way. As a consequence, prosecutorial 
decisions inevitably combine judgments of desert with judgments of resource allocation. 
In practice, moreover, these judgments are so intertwined that they cannot easily be 
separated. Where penalty tariffs are relatively uncontroversial, and there is a general 
consensus favoring full or nearly full enforcement, the prosecutorial judgments to be 
made in particular cases will be more narrowly adjudicatory: determining the strength of 
the evidence and the presence or absence of fairly specific and commonly-accepted 
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. But with crimes that are less serious or more 
controversial, social judgments about the importance of enforcement are more likely to 
fluctuate with available resources. The strength of the evidence in the case (the measure 
of the suspect's guilt or innocence) comes to be a function of the amount of effort society 
is willing to expend to investigate, as well as of the likelihood of guilt, and the degree of 
the offender's culpability begins to be measured not only by comparing his conduct with 
that of others who have been charged and convicted, but also by factoring in the moral 
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and policy consequences of our unwillingness to expend the resources to catch very many 
of those who offend.
165
 
 
This system of administrative decision making by federal prosecutors affects all criminal cases, 
not just those involving corporate defendants. 
 
 Finally, the federal criminal justice system depends upon guilty pleas—and 
cooperation—by the vast majority of defendants.  Corporations complain that they cannot afford 
to go to trial and are coerced into cooperating with the government to avoid crippling 
sanctions.
166
  But the pressure to plead guilty and cooperate in building a case against others is 
another general feature of federal criminal law, and individual defendants are often subject to 
even more powerful pressures as they seek to avoid or limit extremely long mandatory prison 
sentences.  It is quite true that the system depends upon most defendants waiving their rights, but 
this “culture of waiver” in the federal courts extends to all defendants, not just corporate 
defendants., and corporate defendants may be in a more favorable position than individuals 
facing harsh mandatory prison sentences unless they cooperate.
167
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